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![]() Law & PolicyVolume 29 Issue 3, Pages 339 - 367 Published Online: 13 Jun 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 University of Denver
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 177K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective I am grateful to the anonymous referee, to Ben Depoorter, Gerrit de Geest, Ton Hartlief, Roger Van den Bergh, and the participants in the Midterm meeting of the Erasmus Program in Law and Economics in Bologna, as well to participants in workshops at the centre d'analyse économique (CEA) of the faculty of Economics of the University of Aix-Marseille, at the Centre for Risk and Insurance of Nottingham University Business School, at the ETH at the University of Zürich and at the von Sonnenfels Center for the Study of Public Law and Economics in Vienna for useful comments on an earlier version of this article. Copyright © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy ABSTRACTThis article examines the various approaches legislators may use to compensate victims of catastrophes. Traditional law and economics of insurance literature, with respect to government relief and insurance solutions towards financial compensation, is used to analyze (highly diverging) approaches in Europe and the United States. First, the importance of liability (insurance) is discussed in cases where a liable injurer can be identified; second, the possibilities of first-party insurance are examined, whereby various regulatory solutions (particularly the French model of providing mandatory coverage for catastrophes) is critically discussed. The (first-party) insurance solution is compared with public intervention, and a distinction is made between ad hoc government relief on an ex-post basis and structural compensation funds. The solutions applied and discussed in many countries are critically analyzed for their ability to provide adequate compensation at low costs and their effects on incentives for prevention and for developing private (insurance) solutions. |
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IT'S TIME TO RENEW
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