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Mental Causation
Karen Bennett 1*
  1 Princeton University
Copyright © 2007 The Author
Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Abstract

Abstract
          1. Introduction
          2. Substance Dualism I: The Traditional Problem of Interaction
          3. Substance Dualism II: The  Pairing Problem 
          4. Interlude: Nonreductive PhysicalismWorks Cited

Concerns about 'mental causation' are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem – including some forms of physicalism – make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.


Philosophy Compass 2/2 (2007): 316–337, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x About DOI

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