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Wiley InterScience | ||||||||||
 Philosophy CompassVolume 2 Issue 6, Pages 792 - 819 Published Online: 14 Nov 2007 Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 194K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Epistemic Intuitions Copyright © 2007 The Author Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Abstract
We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone's condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them and describes the major positions in that debate. Linguists and psychologists also study epistemic assessments; the last section of the paper discusses some of their research and its potential relevance to epistemology. Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 792–819, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x | 
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