|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||
  The Economic JournalVolume 117 Issue 517, Pages F11 - F51 Published Online: 27 Mar 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 by the Royal Economic Society (Registered Charity No. 231508) Published on behalf of the Royal Economic Society
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 1014K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Using Repayment Data to Test Across Models of Joint Liability Lending* * We thank three anonymous referees, Francisco Buera, Jonathan Conning, Hidehiko Ichimura, Steve Levitt, Costas Meghir, Derek Neal, Sombat Sakuntasathien, seminar participants at Chicago, Groningen, London School of Economics, Southern California, University College London, Vanderbilt and at NEUDC 2001, ESSFM 2002, the 2002 European Economic Association meetings, LACEA 2003, and BREAD 2004 for valuable input. Financial support from the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation (including its Graduate Research Fellowship Program) is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are ours. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007 ABSTRACTTheories rationalising joint liability lending are rich in implications for repayment rates. We exploit this fact to test four diverse models. We show that the models' repayment implications do not always coincide. For example, higher correlation of output and borrowers' ability to act cooperatively can raise or lower repayment, depending on the model. Data from Thai borrowing groups suggest that repayment is affected negatively by the joint liability rate (ceteris paribus) and social ties, and positively by the strength of local sanctions and correlated returns. Further, the relative fit of the adverse selection versus informal sanctions models varies by region. Submitted: July 2005 Accepted: October 2005 | 
|
