|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||||||
  American Journal of Political ScienceVolume 51 Issue 4, Pages 738 - 754 Published Online: 2 Oct 2007 © 2010 Midwest Political Science Association Published on behalf of the Midwest Political Science Association
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 614K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Mutual Optimism and War Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Rochester, Columbia University, and NYU. We thank Scott Ashworth, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Songying Fang, Tanisha Fazal, Erik Gartzke, Shigeo Hirano, Adam Meirowitz, John Patty, Pablo Pinto, Robert Powell, Quinn Ramsay, Anne Sartori, Curt Signorino, Branislav Slantchev, Allan Stam, Randy Stone, and Robert Walker, as well as other seminar participants. We would also like to thank the editor of the AJPS and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are our own. Kris Ramsay acknowledges financial support from NSF grant SES-0413381. Copyright 2007, Midwest Political Science Association ABSTRACTWorking with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war—i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self-evident—then there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where wars are fought because of mutual optimism. The fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each side should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We also show that this result extends to situations in which there is bounded rationality and/or noncommon priors. | 
|
| |||||||||||||||||||
 | VIRTUAL ISSUE: Psychological Perspectives on Politics |
Access this free virtual issue of Political Psychology that uses psychological theory and methods to explore important questions in political science. | |
Special Issue on David Sears |  |
Political Psychology recently published a special Forum on David O. Sears' Ongoing Contribution to Political Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell is pleased to offer free online access to all the articles from this special journal issue. | |
 |
