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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
  Journal of Public Economic TheoryVolume 9 Issue 6, Pages 1069 - 1078 Published Online: 17 Oct 2007 © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Published on behalf of the Association for Public Economic Theory
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 83K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking 
Extendable Cooperative Games
Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (azrieliy@post.tau.ac.il), (lehrer@post.tau.ac.il). We thank David Schmeidler, Eilon Solan, an anonymous referee, and the editor of the Journal of Public Economic Theory for their remarks and suggestions which significantly improved this paper. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Abstract
A (TU) cooperative game is extendable if every core allocation of each subgame can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its subgames can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core. Further, we characterize extendability in terms of an extension of the balanced cover of the game. It is also shown how this extension can unify the analysis of many families of games under one roof. Received August 25, 2005; Accepted January 25, 2007. | 
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