If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||
  American Journal of Agricultural EconomicsVolume 89 Issue 1, Pages 12 - 23 Published Online: 9 Feb 2007 © 2009 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 534K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking 
Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry
Partial support for this research was provided by the Agricultural Marketing Resource Center, Iowa State University. Copyright 2007 American Agricultural Economics Association KEYWORDS imperfect information • product quality • quality assurance • repeated purchases • reputations • supply chain • value-added agriculture ABSTRACTMany food traits desired by consumers are costly to provide and difficult to verify. A complicating factor is that delivered quality can only be affected stochastically by producers and imperfectly observed by consumers. Markets for these goods will emerge only if supplying firms can be trusted. We develop a repeated purchases model to explore how quality discoverability, market structure, nature of reputations, market premiums, and discount factors drive firm choice about the stringency of quality assurance systems designed to gain consumer trust. Reputation protection is key incentive for firms to invest in high-quality goods and quality assurance systems.
[Received December 2004; | 
|
Become a new member!
| |||||||||
