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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||
  Scottish Journal of Political EconomyVolume 54 Issue 5, Pages 750 - 773 Published Online: 30 Oct 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 Scottish Economic Society Published on behalf of the Scottish Economic Society
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 204K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  LIMITED COMMITMENT MODELS OF THE LABOUR MARKET Copyright © 2007 Scottish Economic Society KEYWORDS Labour contracts • self-enforcing contracts • business cycle • un-employment KEYWORDS E32 • J41 ABSTRACT
We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labour contracts in which risk-sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two-sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empirical testing and the available empirical evidence. We also consider the one-sided limited commitment problem for which there exists a considerable amount of empirical support. Date of receipt of final manuscript: 1 August 2007 | 
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