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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  Economics & PoliticsVolume 19 Issue 3, Pages 345 - 368 Published Online: 14 Sep 2007 © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 165K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF IN A CUSTOMS UNION: VOTING, LOGROLLING, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS Copyright © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ABSTRACTMissing from the analysis of customs unions has been a consideration of collective decision-making by countries regarding the union's common trade policy. In the case of the common European external tariff, how governments voted was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to derive member states' tariff preferences, which are then used to establish the decision rule before 1987, when individual governments had veto power. Results indicate a principle of unanimity, as well as the presence of logrolling. The political equilibrium for the common external tariff is also illustrated to have shifted as a result of union enlargements. | 
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