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Wiley InterScience | ||||||||||||||
  Journal of Regional ScienceVolume 47 Issue 5, Pages 897 - 913 Published Online: 27 Sep 2007 © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 150K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  TAX COMPETITION IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF CRIME PREVENTION* *I would like to thank participants of the 50th Annual North American Meetings of the Regional Science Association International, 2003, two anonymous referees, and Marlon G. Boarnet for their helpful comments. As usual, all errors are mine. Copyright Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2007 ABSTRACTABSTRACT. The paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition when local governments choose the level of public goods that generate spillover effects elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement activities affect both the crime level in the jurisdiction providing the good and in neighboring communities. The model shows that when local governments rely on capital taxation to finance these expenditures the spillover effects may not lead to an inefficient provision of public goods as predicted by the tax competition literature. In the model, capital is costlessly mobile and offenders relocate responding to differential criminal opportunities and differential local law enforcement efforts. Received: February 2006; revised: December 2006; accepted: April 2007. | 
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