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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||
![]() Political StudiesVolume 55 Issue 4, Pages 683 - 708 Published Online: 17 Jul 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 Political Studies Association and Blackwell Publishing Ltd Published by the Political Studies Association and Blackwell Publishing
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 168K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking For Queen and Company: The Role of Intelligence in the UK's Arms Trade Copyright © 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association ABSTRACTThis article analyses the role that the UK intelligence services (particularly Secret Intelligence Service [SIS or MI6], the Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS], Government Communication Headquarters [GCHQ] and associated agencies) play in the legal UK arms trade. The article shows that intelligence has been used in support of British-based private commercial businesses, and occasionally in providing intelligence on the negotiating positions of rival manufacturers. This raises important questions about the role of the state in the private sphere, particularly the use of a large number of government assets in support of private interests and the elision of British government interests with those of a section of the manufacturing industry. This article also challenges existing conceptions of how the UK's intelligence agencies operate and relate to their customers. Conventional typologies of UK intelligence have emphasised the importance of the 'central machinery', highlighting the Joint Intelligence Committee as the focal point of intelligence tasking and analysis in the UK. However, in this case the intelligence support provided to the sale of military equipment suggests a range of parallel practices that are much more decentralised and often informal. This research therefore suggests that our conception of the UK intelligence architecture requires some reassessment. (Accepted: 4 July 2006) |
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