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Wiley InterScience | ||||||||||
![]() Philosophy CompassVolume 1 Issue 5, Pages 432 - 448 Published Online: 29 Aug 2006 Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 176K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking Knowing from Testimony Copyright © Blackwell Publishing 2006 Abstract
Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. Were we to refrain from accepting the testimony of others, our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways. Despite the vital role that testimony occupies in our epistemic lives, traditional epistemological theories have focused primarily on other sources, such as sense perception, memory, and reason, with relatively little attention devoted specifically to testimony. In recent years, however, the epistemic significance of testimony has been more fully appreciated. I shall here focus on two questions that have received the most attention in recent work in the epistemology of testimony. First, is testimonial knowledge acquired only by being transmitted from speaker to hearer? Second, must a hearer have positive reasons to justifiedly accept a speaker's testimony? Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00035.x |