|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||
  EconometricaVolume 74 Issue 3, Pages 753 - 769 Published Online: 27 Apr 2006 © 2009 The Econometric Society
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 126K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale This paper and its online supplement (Garratt and Tröger (2006)) include content from two previous working papers: "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale" by Garratt and Tröger (2003) and "Speculations in First-Price Auctions with Resale" by Tröger (2003). We are grateful to Ted Bergstrom, Ken Binmore, James McAndrews, Eddie Dekel, David Easley, Gunnar Gunnarson, Matthew Jackson, Philippe Jehiel, Alexander Koch, Stephan Lauermann, Steve LeRoy, Benny Moldovanu, Georg Nöldeke, Jörg Oechssler, Thomas Palfrey, Hugo Sonnenschein, Ennio Stacchetti, Bill Zame, Charles Zheng, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) through SFB/TR 15 "Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems" is gratefully acknowledged. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006 KEYWORDS Standard auctions • speculation • resale • efficiency ABSTRACTIn standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private-value bidders. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions. Manuscript received May, 2004; final revision received September, 2005. | 
|
