Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects1

doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00609.x

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Wiley InterScience

Noûs

Volume 40 Issue 2, Pages 256 - 283

Published Online: 8 May 2006

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Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects¹

Robert D. Rupert ^a

^a University of Colorado, Boulder

¹ I would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Summer Stipend (2002) that supported work on this essay. Thanks also to Edward Averill, Carl Gillett, Sungsu Kim, Aaron Meskin, Doug Kutach, Mariam Thalos, Eric Hiddleston, Rob Lovering, and two anonymous referees for Noûs for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Shorter versions of the paper were presented at the 2003 meeting of the Eastern Division of the APA, at North Carolina State University, at the University of Colorado-Boulder, and, in poster form, at the 2003 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Members of all four audiences gave helpful feedback, for which I am grateful; special thanks to John Carroll, Jonathan Cohen, Phil Robbins, Ron Endicott, Anthony Dardis, Jay Newhard, and Colin Allen for stimulating questions and discussion.