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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||||||||
  Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 72 Issue 2, Pages 286 - 318 Published Online: 1 Aug 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 2036K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Reasons for Belief Copyright 2006 International Phenomenological Society ABSTRACTDavidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is presupposed in Davidson's claim. While 1 focus on McDowell's view, the argument generalizes to other views which take experiences as reasons for belief. | 
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