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Wiley InterScience | ||||||
  Journal of Accounting ResearchVolume 44 Issue 1, Pages 113 - 143 Published Online: 23 Jan 2006 © 2010 The Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 238K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud? We have benefited from comments from Ray Ball (editor), Robert Bushman, Ilia Dichev, Arthur Kraft, Mark Lang, Shiva Rajgopal, John Robinson, Steve Rock, Phil Shane, Terry Shevlin, Joel Slemrod; workshop participants at London Business School, Michigan State University, UC-Berkeley, UCLA, the University of Colorado, the University of Florida, the University of North Carolina, the University of Oregon, the University of Texas at Austin, and Washington University; and an anonymous referee. Judson Caskey, Scott Dyreng, and Brad Lindsey provided valuable research assistance. We appreciate funding from the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan and an Ernst & Young Faculty Fellowship, and the University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School, respectively. Copyright 2006 The Institute of Professional Accounting, University of Chicago ABSTRACT
We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud. We measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests. We find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud. These results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock-based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud. Received 8 April 2004; accepted 3 August 2005 | 
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