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Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President
Valentino Larcinese 1 Leonzio Rizzo 2 Cecilia Testa 3
  1 London School of Economics and Political Science
  2 Universita' di Ferrara and Universita' Cattolica di Milano
  3 Royal Holloway College, University of London
Correspondence to  Valentino Larcinese is lecturer in government and research associate at STICERD, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. Leonzio Rizzo is lecturer in economics, Universita' di Ferrara and Universita' Cattolica di Milano, Italy. Cecilia Testa is lecturer in economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, United Kingdom.
Copyright 2006 Southern Political Science Association

ABSTRACT

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the U.S. federal budget allocation to the states. Departing from the existing literature that gives prominence to Congress, we carry on an empirical investigation on the impact of presidents during the period 1982–2000. Our findings suggest that federal budget allocation is affected by presidential politics. States that heavily supported the incumbent president in past presidential elections tend to receive more funds, while marginal and swing states are not rewarded. Party affiliation also matters since states whose governor belong to the same party of the president receive more federal funds, while states opposing the president's party in Congressional elections are penalized. These results show that presidents are engaged in tactical distribution of federal funds and also provide good evidence in support of partisan theories of budget allocation.


Manuscript submitted 26 January 2005
Manuscript accepted for publication 6 July 2005

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00419.x About DOI

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