If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | ||
  Journal of PoliticsVolume 68 Issue 4, Pages 867 - 878 Published Online: 6 Oct 2006 2007 Southern Political Science Association
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 287K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Modeling Motivations: A Method for Inferring Judicial Goals from Behavior Copyright 2006 Southern Political Science Association ABSTRACTThe consensus among most scholars of American politics is that judges are policy seekers. Yet we know very little about what motivates judges in other parts of the world. To begin to address this gap, we develop a systematic method for inferring goals from behavior. Using a simple game-theoretic framework, we generate a series of testable propositions linking behavioral outcomes to goals for four ideal types of judges: loyalists, policy seekers, institutionalists, and careerists. We illustrate the power of our method with original data on individual and collective judicial decision making on the Argentine Supreme Court (1976–2000). Manuscript submitted 9 August 2005 |  |
