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On the Credibility of Currency Boards*
Switgard Feuerstein 1 and Oliver Grimm 2
  1 Faculty of Economics, Law and Social Sciences, University of Erfurt, Germany
  2 ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Correspondence to  Feuerstein: Faculty of Economics, Law and Social Sciences, University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany. Tel: +49 361 737 4621; Fax: +49 361 737 4629; E-mail: switgard.feuerstein@uni-erfurt.de. Grimm: CER-ETH—Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland. Tel +41 446 328 722; Fax: +41 446 321 867; E-mail: grimm@mip.mtec.ethz.ch.

  We thank Helge Berger, Hans Gersbach, Jochen Michaelis, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also benefited from discussions at conferences in Göttingen (Workshop for International Economics), Warsaw (Spring Meeting of Young Economists), Madrid (European Economic Association), Strasbourg (Symposium on Banking and Monetary Policy), and Bonn (German Economic Association).

Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Abstract

Abstract1. Introduction2. The Model3. Free-float Regime4. Policy Options under a Currency BoardNotes

The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time-consuming legislative process and an abolition will thus be well-anticipated. Therefore, a currency board solves the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy. However, policy can react to unexpected shocks only with a time lag, thus the threat of large shocks makes the abolition more likely. Currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if the time-inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, that can be left at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute the dominant problem.


DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00621.x About DOI

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