|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||
  Review of Economic StudiesVolume 73 Issue 2, Pages 531 - 548 Published Online: 7 Apr 2006 © 2010 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 119K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments Copyright 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited ABSTRACTThis paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information. The combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long-term assignments. More generally, however, rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents, which mitigates incentive constraints. With complete contracts that communicate interim states, rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better-targeted incentives. Furthermore, it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal. Properties of the production technology are also shown to matter. Substitutability of intertemporal effort is a force for long-term assignments, while coordination with Nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation. First version received October 2003; final version accepted September 2005 (Eds.) | 
|
