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Wiley InterScience

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Volume 77 Issue 4, Pages 453 - 478

Published Online: 28 Nov 2006

Journal compilation © 2009 CIRIEC


Published on behalf of the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC)
International Centre of Research and Information on the Public and Cooperative Economy
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THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS OF DELEGATION CONTRACTS IN THE FRENCH URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECTOR: WHY COMPETITIVE TENDERING IS A MYTH
Anne Yvrande-Billon
  1 ATOM, University of Paris 1, France
 

*This paper received the Michael Beesley Award for Excellence in Research at the 9th International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport (Lisbon, 5–9 September 2005).
I wish to thank David Hensher, Marc Ivaldi, Pierre Kopp, Roger Vickerman, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to the participants at the Thredbo conference 2005 (Lisbon, September 2005) and at the IDEI Conference on Public Services and Management: Designs, Issues and Implications for Local Governance (Toulouse, January 2006). Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
Email address: yvrande@univ-paris1.fr

 

** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.

Copyright 2006 The Author Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2006

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT** This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.


DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00315.x About DOI

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