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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||
  Presidential Studies QuarterlyVolume 35 Issue 2, Pages 333 - 360 Published Online: 13 May 2005 © 2010 Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Published by the Center for the Study of the Presidency
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 203K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, and Information Flow AUTHOR's NOTE: Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2002 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and 2003 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Thanks to Brandice Canes-Wrone, Matt Dickinson, Dave Lewis, Jim Pfiffner, research workshop participants at Princeton's Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, and especially Tom Hammond for helpful conversations and comments on various aspects of this ongoing project. All errors, needless to say, remain my own. Copyright 2005 Center for the Study of the Presidency ABSTRACTThis article draws on various theories of organization and hierarchy to argue that presidential staff may be conceived as a necessary limiting structure on an otherwise chaotic informational environment. As such, the shape of that structure shapes the kind, caliber, and amount of information presidents receive on policy matters. Melding classic organization theory and recent formal work with earlier hypotheses about staff effectiveness, I argue that informational institutions centered on functional rather than specific policy lines will best serve the president, and that parallel processing and other monitoring mechanisms will also help the president obtain good advice. Evidence from the Truman, Reagan, and Bush II administrations is used to illustrate this theory and sketch a more systematic research agenda. | 
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