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Wiley InterScience | |||||||
  Fiscal StudiesVolume 26 Issue 1, Pages 119 - 135 Published Online: 18 Mar 2005 © Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2009 Published on behalf of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 98K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Credible Pensions* *This research forms part of the UBS–LSE Pensions Research Programme. The authors are grateful to participants in the British Association, Festival of Science meeting for comments and to Nicholas Barr, Howard Glennerster, John Hills and Helen Simpson for helpful feedback on an earlier draft. Copyright Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2005 Abstract
One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans. | 
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