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Wiley InterScience | ||||||||
  Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 87 Issue 1, Pages 24 - 44 Published Online: 24 Feb 2006 Journal compilation © 2009 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 105K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  IS METAETHICS MORALLY NEUTRAL? Copyright © 2006 The Author Journal compilation
© 2006 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ABSTRACTAbstract: I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the (quite plausible) moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes to all metaethical positions. | 
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