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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||
  Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 87 Issue 4, Pages 403 - 421 Published Online: 14 Dec 2006 Journal compilation © 2009 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 140K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  TELEOFUNCTIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION Copyright © 2006 The Author Journal compilation © 2006 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Abstract:
Fred Dretske's teleofunctional theory of content aims to simultaneously solve two ground-floor philosophical puzzles about mental content: the problem of naturalism and the problem of epiphenomenalism. It is argued here that his theory fails on the latter score. Indeed, the theory insures that content can have no place in the causal explanation of action at all. The argument for this conclusion depends upon only very weak premises about the nature of causal explanation. The difficulties Dretske's theory encounters indicate the severe challenges involved in arriving at a robust naturalistic understanding of content. | 
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