|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume 108 Issue 4, Pages 727 - 742 Special Issue: Political Economy Published Online: 3 Jan 2007 © 2009 the editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 111K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption Copyright The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2006 KEYWORDS Scoring rules • corruption • approval voting • Borda voting • plurality • serious race • population uncertainty KEYWORDS
D72 Abstract
The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model. | 
|
