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Wiley InterScience | ||||||||||
  Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsVolume 108 Issue 4, Pages 643 - 668 Special Issue: Political Economy Published Online: 3 Jan 2007 © 2009 the editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 168K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Lobbying Bureaucrats* *We would like to thank Torben Iversen, Keith Krehbiel, Torsten Persson, Jim Snyder, Justin Wolfers, seminar participants at the University of Chicago, CEBR, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen Business School, Institute for International Economic Studies in Stockholm, Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Copyright The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2006 KEYWORDS Delegation • political institutions • interest group influence • divided government KEYWORDS
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H1 Abstract
We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying. | 
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