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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  The Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 54 Issue 214, Pages 56 - 77 Published Online: 28 Jun 2008 Journal compilation © 2010 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 124K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Articles Structuralism and Metaphysics Copyright The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 ABSTRACTI consider different versions of a structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which characteristic mathematical objects have no more of a 'nature' than is given by the basic relations of a structure in which they reside. My own version of such a view is non-eliminative in the sense that it does not lead to a programme for eliminating reference to mathematical objects. I reply to criticisms of non-eliminative structuralism recently advanced by Keränen and Hellman. In replying to the former, I rely on a distinction between 'basic' and 'constructed' structures. A conclusion is that ideas from the metaphysical tradition can be misleading when applied to the objects of modern mathematics. Received: 00 0000; Accepted: 00 0000; | 
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