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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  The Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 54 Issue 217, Pages 497 - 517 Published Online: 16 Sep 2004 Journal compilation © 2010 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 111K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Minimalism and the Value of Truth Copyright The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004 ABSTRACTMinimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true i. p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project. | 
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