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Wiley InterScience

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Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole
 Princeton University and Institute for Advanced Study
 IDEI (Université de Toulouse I), CERAS and MIT
Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2003

ABSTRACT

A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine "intrinsic motivation". We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.


Received on February 2000 and accepted for publication on January 2003

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/1467-937X.00253 About DOI

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