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Wiley InterScience

Economic Policy

Economic Policy

Volume 18 Issue 36, Pages 9 - 72

Published Online: 31 Mar 2003

© 2010 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme



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Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evidence
Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta
  OECD Economics Department; World Bank, Human Development Network
 

Box 1. Using MFP growth as a proxy for technological progress

Direct data on technical progress are impossible to obtain on an economy-wide basis. In lieu of direct data, economists estimate a proxy for technical progress from data on outputs and inputs. The basic idea is that any output growth that is not accompanied by a growth in inputs must be due to a more efficient use of the inputs, that is to say, it must be due to productivity growth. Such calculations must inevitably confront a series of practical problems – What weights should be assigned to the various inputs? Should the hours of skilled and unskilled workers be lumped together? etc. (Data construction details are in the Appendix.) Our MFP measure is no exception, so one should be mindful of the fact that MFP is not a perfect measure, and that it is constructed from the data (this poses statistical problems in Section 4). Nevertheless, using such measures is absolutely standard practice. There really is no better way to measure economy-wide productivity. Note that multifactor productivity is also known as total factor productivity (TFP).

 

Box 2. Differentiating anticompetitive regulations across industries

We treated barriers to entry in manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries differently, reflecting structural differences between the two sectors. In non-manufacturing, we cover mainly legal and structural barriers such as restrictive licensing, restrictions on the establishment of foreign companies, legal monopoly (or duopoly), and vertical integration or lack of third-party access in network industries. In manufacturing industries, we assumed that relevant barriers included only administrative burdens and tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Clearly, the range of industry-specific regulations that may affect product market competition in manufacturing industries is wider (including, for instance, technical or quality standards, intellectual property rights and antitrust exemptions). However, cross-country information on these regulations is hard to find, and their impact on competition is often difficult to assess.
As regards price controls, we distinguished between competitive industries and industries where market power is widespread (e.g. due to technology): while we regard controls in the former as anti-competitive (especially when enforced by incumbents), we view controls in industries with market power as anti-competitive when they fail to discipline rents, lead to distortions (e.g. the so-called Averch-Johnson effects) or encourage anti-competitive behaviour (e.g. opportunities for cross-subsidization and predation). A distinction along the same lines is made for other constraints on business operation. In competitive industries, such constraints are deemed to restrict market mechanisms, but universal service obligations are not included among anti-competitive regulations in network industries. This is because, in general, it is not the obligation per se but the way in which it is implemented that may hinder competition in certain network industries (see, for instance, Gonençet al., 2001) and, unfortunately, cross-country data on the implementation of universal service obligations are not widely available. (A typical example is the obligation for an incumbent to provide service to some customers at prices below cost while funding the losses with rents earned from the sale of other services.)

Copyright © CEPR, CES, MSH, 2003.

SUMMARY

Abstract1. INTRODUCTION2. THE THEORY: THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION IN GROWTH3. PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION, GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITION IN OECD COUNTRIES4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE REGULATION PRODUCTIVITY LINKREFERENCES

Liberalization and privatization have made the regulatory environment more market-friendly throughout the OECD. However using a large new dataset on product market regulation, we show that regulatory policies in OECD nations have become more dissimilar in relative terms, even as all nations have liberalized. This seemingly contradictory finding is explained by different starting points and different reform speeds. Our data also show that this divergence in the regulatory settings lines up with the divergent growth performance of OECD nations, in particular the poor performance of large Continental economies relative to that of the US. The data, which tracks various types of product market regulation in manufacturing and service industries for 18 OECD economies over the past two decades, allows us to explore this link in detail. We find that productivity growth is boosted by reforms that promote private corporate governance and competition (where these are viable). Moreover, our detailed findings suggest how product market regulation and productivity growth are linked. In manufacturing, the productivity gains from liberalization are greater the further a given country is from the technology leader. This indicates that entry-limiting regulation may hinder the adoption of existing technologies, possibly by reducing competitive pressures, technology spillovers, or the entry of new high-tech firms. These results offer an interpretation of poor Continental performance. Strict product market regulations – and lack of regulatory reforms – appear to underlie the meagre productivity performance of some European countries, especially in those industries where Europe has accumulated a technology gap (e.g. industries producing or using information and communication technologies).

— Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta


DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/1468-0327.00102 About DOI

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