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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||||
  The Journal of FinanceVolume 57 Issue 1, Pages 265 - 301 Published Online: 17 Dec 2002 © 2010 the American Finance Association
Abstract | Full Text: PDF (Size: 163K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Government Ownership of Banks Copyright The American Finance Association 2002 ABSTRACTWe assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms. | 
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Conference and Special Issue on Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis
24-25 September 2010 in Philadelphia, USA
Deadline for Conference Proposals: 1 March 2010
Deadline for Special Issue Papers: 1 August 2010
Special Issue on Private Equity, LBOs, and Corporate Governance: International Evidence
Submission deadline: 1 March 2010
Guest edited by Igor Filatotchev, Donald Siegel and Mike Wright
