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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
![]() The Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 50 Issue 198, Pages 57 - 67 Published Online: 7 Jan 2003 Journal compilation © 2010 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 112K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification ABSTRACTThe presence of accidentality in a subject's holding a belief is generally thought to be incompatible with that belief7apos;s being an instance of know-ledge. Epistemologists have tended to focus on the accidentality of the truth of a belief. I argue (a) that it is also possible that there be accidentality in the justification of a belief, and (b) that the consequences of this type of accidentality are potentially much more harmful than accidentality only in the truth of a belief. |
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