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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||
  The Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 58 Issue 231, Pages 326 - 335 Published Online: 18 May 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Abstract | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 71K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  SEA BATTLE SEMANTICS Copyright Journal compilation © 2007 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly ABSTRACT
The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow', while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later 'become' true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents. Received: xx xxxx; Accepted: xx xxxx; | 
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