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Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  Economics & PoliticsVolume 20 Issue 1, Pages 33 - 61 Published Online: 10 Sep 2007 © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 164K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS Copyright © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself. | 
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