|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||||||||||||||||||||||
  Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 71 Issue 1, Pages 134 - 142 Published Online: 29 May 2007 Journal compilation © 2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Abstract | References | Full Text: PDF (Size: 491K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  Accidentally Factive Mental States Copyright 2005 International Phenomenological Society ABSTRACTKnowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. the moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental state. I argue, however, that Gettier cases pose a serious problem for Williamson's epistemology: in these cases, the subject may have a factive mental state that fails to be cognitive. Hence, knowledge cannot be the most general factive mental state. | 
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||
 | Special issue of Journal of Social Philosophy |
The Global Environment, Climate Change, and Justice Click here for free access. | |
 | It’s time to renew your subscription to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. |
Click here for 2010 subscription rates and to renew securely online. | |
