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Wiley InterScience

Psychological Science

Psychological Science

Volume 15 Issue 1, Pages 27 - 32

Published Online: 7 Jan 2004

© 2009 Association for Psychological Science


A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science (previously the American Psychological Society)
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Research Article
Visual Sensing Without Seeing
Ronald A. Rensink
 Departments of Psychology and Computer Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
 Address correspondence to R.A. Rensink, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada; e-mail: rensink@psych.ubc.ca.
Copyright Copyright © 2004 American Psychological Science

ABSTRACT

Abstract—It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., seeing). The studies reported here show that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or sense) the change even though they have no visual experience of it. The subjective difference between sensing and seeing is mirrored in several behavioral differences, suggesting that these are two distinct modes of conscious visual perception.


(Received 10/29/01; Revision accepted 2/11/03)

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01501005.x About DOI

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