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![]() MetaphilosophyVolume 39 Issue 3, Pages 265 - 281 Published Online: 6 Jun 2008 Journal compilation © 2009 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 128K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE Copyright Journal compilation © 2008 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd KEYWORDS aesthetic judgement • Kant • philosophical experience • secondary sense • universality • Wittgenstein ABSTRACTAbstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called "aesthetic judgements." Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called "secondary sense." Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice. |
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