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Wiley InterScience

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II—Virtues of Art: Good Taste
Dominic McIver Lopes 1
  1 Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T IZI, dom.lopes@ubc.ca
Copyright © 2008 The Aristotelian Society

ABSTRACT

If good taste is a virtue, then an account of good taste might be modelled on existing accounts of moral or epistemic virtue. One good reason to develop such an account is that it helps solve otherwise intractable problems in aesthetics. This paper proposes an alternative to neo-Aristotelian models of good taste. It then contrasts the neo-Aristotelian models with the proposed model, assessing them for their potential to contend with otherwise intractable problems in aesthetics.


DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)
10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00169.x About DOI

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