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Wiley InterScience | |||
  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)Volume 105 Issue 1, Pages 219 - 235 Published Online: 8 Aug 2005 © 2009 The Aristotelian Society
Abstract | Full Text: PDF (Size: 92K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  IX *—CONFLICTING APPEARANCES, NECESSITY AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF PROPOSITIONS ABOUT COLOURS *Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday, 21 February, 2005 at 4.15 p.m. Copyright The Aristotelian Society 2005 ABSTRACTABSTRACT Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances' Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phenomenalism', rather than physicalism, is required to give a satisfactory account of the necessity of Wittgenstein's 'puzzle propositions' about colour. | 
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