|
If you are seeing this message, you may be experiencing temporary network problems. Please wait a few minutes and refresh the page. If the problem persists, you may wish to report it to your local Network Manager.
It is also possible that your web browser is not configured or not able to display style sheets. In this case, although the visual presentation will be degraded, the site should continue to be functional. We recommend using the latest version of Microsoft or Mozilla web browser to help minimise these problems.
Wiley InterScience | |||||||||
  The Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 59 Issue 235, Pages 237 - 251 Published Online: 16 Apr 2008 Journal compilation © 2010 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Abstract | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 85K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking  LUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM Copyright Journal compilation © 2008 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly ABSTRACTLibertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck. | 
| ||||||||
