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![]() Economic InquiryVolume 46 Issue 3, Pages 411 - 424 Published Online: 14 Jan 2008 © 2009 Western Economic Association International A Journal of the Western Economic Association International
Abstract | References | Full Text: HTML, PDF (Size: 169K) | Related Articles | Citation Tracking THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL FORCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE BEHAVIOR OF FOOTBALL REFEREES *I am grateful to IMP AG for providing the data. I would like to thank especially Holger Rahlfs and Jörn Wendland for their cooperation. I am also indebted to the DFB, particularly to Klaus Löw, for providing detailed information on financial rewards for referees and their evaluation. I thank Michael Collins, Armin Falk, Luis Garicano, David Huffman, Ben Kriechel, Winfried Koeniger, Steven Levitt, Canice Prendergast, Uwe Sunde, two anonymous referees, and the editor for helpful comments. I am also grateful for comments and suggestions of seminar participants at Maastricht University, the University of Chicago, Institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, participants of the 17th Annual Conference of the European Society for Population Economics in New York and of the 58th European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Stockholm on earlier drafts of the paper. All errors are mine. Copyright © 2008 Western Economic Association International ABSTRACTAnalyzing the neutrality of referees during 12 German premier league (1. Bundesliga) soccer seasons, this paper documents evidence that social forces influence agents' decisions. Referees, who are appointed to be impartial, tend to favor the home team by systematically awarding more stoppage time in close matches in which the home team is behind. They also favor the home team in decisions to award goals and penalty kicks. Crowd composition affects the size and the direction of the bias, and the crowd's proximity to the field is related to the quality of refereeing. (JEL J00) Online Early publication January 14, 2008 |
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