ACADEMIC TENURE, POSTTENURE EFFORT, AND CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES

doi:10.1093/ei/cbi061

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Wiley InterScience

Economic Inquiry

Volume 43 Issue 4, Pages 831 - 839

Published Online: 26 Mar 2007

A Journal of the Western Economic Association International

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ACADEMIC TENURE, POSTTENURE EFFORT, AND CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES

Antony Dnes ¹ , Nuno Garoupa ¹ *

¹ Dnes: Professor, Business School, University of Hull, Kingston-upon-Hull, HU6 7RX, England. Phone 44-1482-465875, Fax 44-1482-466216, E-mail a.dnes@hull.ac.uk ² Garoupa: Research Affiliate, CEPR, London; and Professor, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, P-1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal. Phone 351-21-3801600, Fax 351-21-387033, E-mail ngaroupa@fe.unl.pt

ABSTRACT

In this article we explore the incentive properties of academic tenure relative to alternatives that might be substitutes for tenure, in particular contractual damages. We emphasize the role of tenure in providing an incentive for incumbent faculty to reveal the characteristics of recruits and to maintain their own performance posttenure. Our results suggest that tenure is just one of many mechanisms potentially able to achieve honest revelation. (JEL I2, K0, L2)

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI)

10.1093/ei/cbi061 About DOI