Philosophy Compass

Aesthetics and Cognitive Science

Dustin Stokes — 2009-07-14T10:15:00Z

Experiences of art involve exercise of ordinary cognitive and perceptual capacities but in unique ways. These two features of experiences of art imply the mutual importance of aesthetics and cognitive science. Cognitive science provides empirical and theoretical analysis of the relevant cognitive capacities. Aesthetics thus does well to incorporate cognitive scientific research. Aesthetics also offers philosophical analysis of the uniqueness of the experience of art. Thus, cognitive science does well to incorporate the explanations of aesthetics. This paper explores this general framework of expansionism: a research strategy that suggests that the explanatory goals and resources of both aesthetics and cognitive science should expand to include those of the other. Two relations are considered. First, what is the relation between aesthetics and more traditional cognitive science? Second, what is the relation between aesthetics and new developments in cognitive science that de-emphasize mental representation and emphasize body and action?

Taste and Objectivity: The Emergence of the Concept of the Aesthetic

Elisabeth Schellekens — 2009-08-23T12:22:00Z

Can there be a philosophy of taste? This paper opens by raising some metaphilosophical questions about the study of taste [ndash] what it consists of and what method we should adopt in pursuing it. It is suggested that the best starting point for philosophising about taste is against the background of 18th-century epistemology and philosophy of mind, and the conceptual tools this new philosophical paradigm entails. The notion of aesthetic taste in particular, which emerges from a growing sense of dissatisfaction with an undifferentiated category of taste, comes to be set apart from gustatory taste on account of its normativity and aspirations to objectivity. The paradox of taste, as found in Hume and Kant, is examined, and shown to be highly relevant to contemporary metaphysical debate within aesthetics. Specifically, this paper argues that both Realists and Anti-Realists rely more heavily than assumed on the idea of taste.

Works and Performances in the Performing Arts

David Davies — 2009-07-20T12:49:00Z

The primary purpose of the performing arts is to prepare and present 'artistic performances', performances that either are themselves the appreciative focuses of works of art or are instances of other things that are works of art. In the latter case, we have performances of what may be termed 'performed works', as is generally taken to be so with performances of classical music and traditional theatrical performances. In the former case, we have what may be termed 'performance-works', as, for example, in free improvisations. Where we have performances of performed works, a number of distinctive philosophical questions arise: What kind of thing is a performed work? How is it appreciated through its performances? Is 'authenticity' an artistically relevant quality of performances of performed works, and, if so, why? How much of what goes on in the performing arts is rightly viewed as the performance of performed works? Artistic performances, whether or not they are of performed works, raise philosophical questions of their own. Can a performance itself be rightly viewed as a work of art? How do improvisation and rehearsal enter into the performing arts, and how do they bear on the appreciation of artistic performances? What role does the audience play in such performances? Does the performer's use of her own body as an artistic medium, as for example in dance performance, generate special constraints on appreciation? How, finally, does what is usually classified as 'performance art' relate to activities in the performing arts more generally construed? I critically survey the ways in which these questions have been addressed by principal theorists in the field.

Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy

David Christensen — 2009-08-23T12:22:00Z

How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others [ndash] perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are [ndash] hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.

Buck-Passing Accounts of Value

Jussi Suikkanen — 2009-09-23T04:15:00Z

This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value. Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe the arguments which are typically used to motivate these views. The rest of this article investigates how some of the central details of the buck-passing accounts should be specified, and what kind of problems these views face.

Cartesian Sensations

Raffaella De Rosa — 2009-09-23T04:15:00Z

Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on sensory representation.

On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Nonobviousness of Majority Rule

Mathias Risse — 2009-07-14T10:14:00Z

Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.

On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods II: Alternatives to Majority Rule

Mathias Risse — 2009-07-14T10:14:00Z

In this companion piece to 'On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule', we take a closer look at some competitors of majority rule. This exploration supplements the conclusions of the other piece, as well as offers a further-reaching introduction to some of the challenges that this field currently poses to philosophers.

The Open Borders Debate on Immigration

Shelley Wilcox — 2009-07-14T10:15:00Z

Global migration raises important ethical issues. One of the most significant is the question of whether liberal democratic societies have strong moral obligations to admit immigrants. Historically, most philosophers have argued that liberal states are morally free to restrict immigration at their discretion, with few exceptions. Recently, however, liberal egalitarians have begun to challenge this conventional view in two lines of argument. The first contends that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with basic liberal egalitarian values, including freedom and moral equality. The second maintains that affluent, liberal democratic societies are morally obligated to admit immigrants as a partial response to global injustices, such as poverty and human rights violations. This article surveys the main philosophical arguments for these positions on immigration and discusses the critical responses to these arguments.

Identity Theories

Thomas W. Polger — 2009-07-20T12:48:00Z

Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.

Computer Simulation and the Philosophy of Science

Eric Winsberg — 2009-07-20T12:49:00Z

There are a variety of topics in the philosophy of science that need to be rethought, in varying degrees, after one pays careful attention to the ways in which computer simulations are used in the sciences. There are a number of conceptual issues internal to the practice of computer simulation that can benefit from the attention of philosophers. This essay surveys some of the recent literature on simulation from the perspective of the philosophy of science and argues that philosophers have a lot to learn by paying closer attention to the practice of simulation.

Emergence in Physics

Andrew Wayne, Michal Arciszewski — 2009-08-23T12:23:00Z

This paper begins by tracing interest in emergence in physics to the work of condensed matter physicist Philip Anderson. It provides a selective introduction to contemporary philosophical approaches to emergence. It surveys two exciting areas of current work that give good reason to re-evaluate our views about emergence in physics. One area focuses on physical systems wherein fundamental theories appear to break down. The other area is the quantum-to-classical transition, where some have claimed that a complete explanation of the behaviors and features of the objects of classical physics entirely in quantum terms is now within our grasp. We suggest that the most useful way to approach the emergent/non-emergent distinction is in epistemic terms, and more specifically that the failure of reductive explanation is constitutive of emergence in physics.

God and the Natural World in the Seventeenth Century: Space, Time, and Causality

Geoffrey Gorham — 2009-09-23T04:15:00Z

The employment by seventeenth-century natural philosophers of stock theological notions like creation, immensity, and eternity in the articulation and justification of emerging physical programs disrupted a delicate but longstanding balance between transcendent and immanent conceptions of God. By playing a prominent (if not always leading) role in many of the major scientific developments of the period, God became more intimately involved with natural processes than at any time since antiquity. In this discussion, I am particularly concerned with the causal and spatio-temporal relations between God and nature in the seventeenth century as recent scholarship has revealed how dramatically traditional conceptions of these relations were transformed by philosophers and scientists like Descartes, Malebranche, More, and Newton.

Teaching & Learning Guide for Business Ethics: An Overview

Jeffrey Moriarty — 2009-07-14T10:15:00Z

Business ethics is often taught by philosophers, but rarely to students pursuing a degree in philosophy. It is a service course designed primarily for those in business and allied programs (e.g., marketing, accounting). These students typically have little patience for the abstract questions that occupy philosophers. So it is useful to spend time motivating the issues through a consideration of cases drawn from, or modeled on, actual events. Most texts and anthologies are brimming with such cases. From here, the instructor can transition to a careful exploration of the underlying philosophical issues. While the ethical questions raised by business activity are complex and varied, they involve familiar concepts, such as responsibility, autonomy, truth, justice, exploitation, and relativism. The diversity of the field of business ethics allows the instructor to tailor the content of the course to her audience. A course for accounting students may consider the ethical failures leading to Enron's collapse; one for marketing students may consider the ethics of advertising to children; and another for finance students may consider the ethics of insider trading. Most of these articles are widely reprinted. Milton Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits', Ethical Theory and Business, 8th ed., Eds. Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie, and Denis G. Arnold (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), 51[ndash]5. Friedman argues that, within the bounds of law and 'ethical custom', managers should manage the firm as its owners want them to, which usually is to 'make as much money as possible'. R. Edward Freeman, 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation', Business in Ethical Focus: An Anthology, Eds. Fritz Allhoff and Anand Vaidya (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2008), 69[ndash]78. In the classic counterpoint to Friedman's shareholder-centered view, Freeman argues that managers should aim to 'balance' the interests of all stakeholders. W. Michael Hoffman, 'Business and Environmental Ethics', Business Ethics Quarterly 1 (1991): 169[ndash]84. Hoffman defends the view, against critics such as Norman Bowie, that firms have moral obligations to the environment beyond what is required by law. In doing so, he appeals to the view that natural things besides persons have moral status. Tara J. Radin and Patricia H. Werhane, 'Employment-at-Will, Employee Rights, and Future Directions for Employment', Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003): 113[ndash]30. Werhane, together with her recent collaborator Radin, is an influential contributor to philosophical discussions of job security. This article presents their latest thinking, and contains a helpful bibliography. Michael Davis, 'Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing', Business and Professional Ethics Journal 15 (1996): 3[ndash]19. In this tightly argued article, Davis motivates the problem of whistleblowing, criticizes Richard DeGeorge's popular justification of it, and presents his own justification. Thomas Carson, 'Deception and Withholding Information in Sales', Business Ethics Quarterly 11 (2001): 275[ndash]306. How much information should sales people be required to disclose to customers? Carson critiques others' views, then articulates, and defends his own theory. Colin Boyd, 'The Structural Origins of Conflicts of Interest in the Accounting Profession', Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2004): 377[ndash]98. This article explores the conflict of interest at the heart of the collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen and then considers whether the Sarbanes[ndash]Oxley Act of United States is an adequate response. Michael J. Phillips, 'The Inconclusive Ethical Case Against Manipulative Advertising', Business and Professional Ethics Journal 13 (1994): 31[ndash]64. In this detailed and nuanced article, Phillips identifies weaknesses in many common critiques of manipulative (as opposed to merely informative) advertising, but concludes that this practice remains morally problematic. Thomas Donaldson, 'Values in Tension: Ethics Away from Home', Harvard Business Review 74:5 (1996): 48[ndash]62. When in Rome, do as the Romans? Donaldson says 'no', and offers practical advice on how to navigate the morally significant cultural differences in international business. Ian Maitland, 'The Great Non-Debate Over International Sweatshops', Ethical Theory and Business, 8th ed., Eds. Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie, and Denis G. Arnold (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), 597[ndash]608. Maitland rejects a variety of criticisms of 'international sweatshops'. While the conditions in these factories may seem bad to us, he argues, they are often better than anything else available to those who work in them. A History of Business Ethics (Richard T. DeGeorge) http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/conference/presentations/business-ethics-history.html A history of the field by one of its most distinguished contributors. Business Ethics (Alexei Marcoux) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-business/ An up-to-date summary of business ethics research. The Business Ethics Blog (Chris MacDonald) http://www.businessethicsblog.com/ A topical and frequently updated blog on business ethics issues. Knowledge at Wharton/Business Ethics http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/category.cfm?cid=11 Short, accessible pieces covering a range of topics in business ethics. United Nations Global Compact http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html Ten principles for ethical business, explained in detail. There are numerous business ethics textbooks and anthologies. Textbooks generally cover a wider range of topics, but can lack the 'punch' of anthologies composed of articles in which authors defend their own views. Effective anthologies include, but are not limited to: Fritz Allhoff and Anand Vaidya (Eds.), Business in Ethical Focus: An Anthology (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2008). Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie, and Denis G. Arnold (Eds.), Ethical Theory and Business, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008). Joseph R. Desjardins and John J. McCall (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2005). Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H. Werhane (Eds.), Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008). W. Michael Hoffman, Robert E. Frederick, and Mark S. Schwartz (Eds.), Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, 4th ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001). My recommendations that follow indicate in which collection(s) the article appears. The reader can also search for the article online to find its original source. Many are from journals, and can be easily downloaded. A course in business ethics often begins with a brief survey of important moral theories (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue theory) and/or theories of distributive justice (egalitarianism, libertarianism). All of these anthologies contain discussions of these theories. In addition (or instead), it might begin with selections from classic works such as Locke's Second Treatise, Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. These works engage recurring themes in contemporary business ethics, including the nature and value of property rights (Locke), the efficiency of the market (Smith), and the ethical aspects of wage labor (Marx). Appropriate selections from these readings can be found in [1] and [4]. Milton Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits', in [1], [2], [3], [4], and [5]. R. Edward Freeman, 'A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation', in [1] and [5]. Similar articles by Freeman appear in [2], [3], and [4]. John Boatright, 'Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder[ndash]Management Relation: Or, What's So Special About Shareholders?', Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (1994): 393[ndash]407. Joseph Heath, 'Business Ethics Without Stakeholders', in [1]. Norman Bowie, 'Morality, Money, and Motor Cars', in [2], [3], and [5]. W. Michael Hoffman, 'Business and Environmental Ethics', in [5]. Amory B. Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, and Paul Hawken, 'A Road Map for Natural Capitalism', in [3]. Ian Maitland, 'Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument', in [3]. Joseph R. Desjardins and Ronald Duska, 'Drug Testing in Employment', in [1], [3], and [5]. Michael Cranford, 'Drug Testing and the Right to Privacy: Arguing the Ethics of Workplace Drug Testing', in [1]. Richard A. Epstein, 'In Defense of the Contract at Will', in [1], [2], and [4]. Patricia H. Werhane and Tara J. Radin, 'Employment at Will and Due Process', in [1] and [2]. Similar articles by Werhane appear in [3] and [4]. Sissela Bok, 'Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility', in [4]. Michael Davis, 'Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing', in [2]. Albert Z. Carr, 'Is Business Bluffing Ethical?' in [1], [3], and [4]. David M. Holley, 'A Moral Evaluation of Sales Practices', in [5]. Thomas Carson, 'Deception and Withholding Information in Sales', in [3]. Michael J. Phillips, 'The Inconclusive Ethical Case Against Manipulative Advertising', Business and Professional Ethics Journal 13 (1994): 31[ndash]64. Thomas Donaldson, 'Values in Tension: Ethics Away From Home', in [1], [4], and [5]. Ian Maitland, 'The Great Non-Debate Over International Sweatshops', in [1], [2], [3], and [4]. Denis G. Arnold and Norman E. Bowie, 'Sweatshops and Respect for Persons', in [2] and [3]. Nien-hê Hsieh, 'The Obligations of Transnational Corporations: Rawlsian Justice and the Duty of Assistance', Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2004): 643[ndash]61. In whose interests should corporations be managed? Are there any minimum conditions for work quality (including safety, privacy, and participation) that all firms must observe? Or can any conditions be justified, provided that workers freely agree to them? Does the prohibition against deception [ndash] and the requirement to be truthful [ndash] apply just as firmly in the business world as it does in 'real life'? Do firms have obligations to protect the environment beyond what is required by law? What, if anything, makes the environment worthy of special concern? To what extent are firms responsible for the labor practices of their suppliers, especially those in foreign countries? Debate. Have students conduct formal in-class debates about the issues covered in the course. Divide them into teams of 3[ndash]6 students. Each debate will focus on a single question or topic, and will be between two teams who take up opposing views. Each team will prepare a document stating its case. The teams will exchange documents a day or two before the debate. This gives each team time to digest and prepare a response to the other team's case. The original cases and responses will be presented in class, followed by further questions and answers from the debaters and other students. Students can be graded on their in-class performances and work on the supporting documents. (This idea is due to the Wharton Ethics Program.)

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Locke on Language

Walter Ott — 2009-07-20T12:48:00Z

Although a fascination with language is a familiar feature of 20th-century empiricism, its origins reach back at least to the early modern period empiricists. John Locke offers a detailed (if sometimes puzzling) treatment of language and uses it to illuminate key regions of the philosophical topography, particularly natural kinds and essences. Locke's main conceptual tool for dealing with language is 'signification'. Locke's central linguistic thesis is this: words signify nothing but ideas. This on its face seems absurd. Don't we need words to signify things as well? But its very absurdity [ndash] our inclination to dismiss Locke as a 'linguistic idealist'[ndash] should signal to us that we have not yet understood Locke. Doing so must begin with an analysis of signification. Each of the three main interpretations on offer allows Locke to escape the charge of linguistic idealism, although they do so in very different ways. Locke's text also offers an influential account of linguistic particles, words like 'is', 'and' and 'if'. These signify, not ideas, but acts of the mind. These acts can either take place within a proposition, uniting its constituent ideas into a thought that admits of a truth-value, or they can take propositions as their objects, in which case they express attitudes like doubt, assertion and so on. Even this seemingly innocuous sketch of Locke's view is controversial, and many writers, from J.S. Mill onwards, have argued that Locke cannot make sense of propositional attitudes. Apart from the intrinsic interest of these questions, understanding how Locke thinks language works is a prerequisite for understanding his arguments against scholastic essentialism. It also illuminates later discussions of language in Berkeley, Hume and Mill. Losonsky, Michael. 'Language, Meaning, and Mind in Locke's Essay.'The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay. Ed. Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 286[ndash]313. In addition to making some original points, Losonsky provides an excellent overview of the three main competing positions on Lockean signification: the Fregean reading, the Scholastic reading and the Indicator theory (see entries 2[ndash]5 in the following). Kretzmann, Norman. 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory.'Locke on Human Understanding. Ed. I. C. Tipton. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 123[ndash]40. Kretzmann's influential paper offers a broadly Fregean analysis, according to which primary signification is sense and secondary, reference. Locke can then avoid the charge of linguistic idealism, as it is not the case that words signify only ideas. Ashworth, E. J. 'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?'Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 299[ndash]326. Ashworth rejects Kretzmann's view, partly on the grounds of anachronism, and sets Locke in his historical context. As she reads Locke, he holds a scholastic position, according to which signification amounts to 'making known' or 'expressing'. This preserves the portmanteau analysis of Kretzmann: words can primarily signify or express ideas, while secondarily signifying things. Lowe, E. J. 'Language and Meaning,' chapter 4. Locke. London: Routledge, 2005. This is a spirited defense of Locke's claim that words signify ideas against contemporary prejudices. Like Ian Hacking (see entry 7 in the following), Lowe argues that Locke is not offering a semantic theory in anything like the contemporary sense; rather, he is concerned with explaining human communication. Ott, Walter. Locke's Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. On the interpretation offered in chapter 1, Lockean signification is indication: words signify ideas in the same sense in which clouds signify rain. If this view is correct, Locke is departing from the particular scholastic tradition Ashworth focuses on, and embracing instead a tradition running from the Stoics through Thomas Hobbes. http://www.springerlink.com/content/xv362655719101n3/ Winkler, Kenneth. 'Signification, Intention, Projection.' Forthcoming, Philosophia. http://www.springerlink.com/content/xv362655719101n3 Although previous commentators acknowledge the role of intentions in Locke's view (see especially Kretzmann's argument from the uses of words), Winkler claims that they are far more central to Locke's view than has been supposed. In particular, Winkler uses these considerations to criticize the indicator interpretation. Hacking, Ian. Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975. Much broader in focus than these other works, Hacking's classic text has much to say about early modern views on language. Hacking argues that Hobbes and Locke do not, properly speaking, even have theories of meaning. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Locke, by William Uzgalis: The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Locke, author unknown: Ashworth, E. J. 'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?'Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 299[ndash]326. Kretzmann, Norman. 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory.'Locke on Human Understanding. Ed. I. C. Tipton. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 123[ndash]40. Locke, Essay III. i[ndash]iii. Lowe, E. J. 'Language and Meaning,' chapter 4. Locke. London: Routledge, 2005. Locke, Essay III. vii. Ott, Walter. 'Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy.'Dialogue 41 (2002): 1[ndash]18. Owen, David. 'Locke on Judgment.'The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay. Ed. Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. 406[ndash]35. If one wanted to explore whether and how Locke applies his semiotic theory in his anti-essentialist argument, one might add (or perhaps replace Week 3 with): Locke, Essay III. vi; III.xi. 4[ndash]22. Bolton, Martha. 'The Relevance of Locke's Theory of Ideas to his Doctrine of Nominal Essence and Anti-Essentialist Semantic Theory.'Locke. Ed. Vere Chappell. Oxford: OUP, 1998. pp. 214[ndash]225 Ott, Walter. 'Locke's Argument from Signification.'Locke Studies 2 (2002): 145[ndash]76. What is a semantic theory? What do we want out of such a theory, and does Locke even purport to provide one? What are the differences among the three main competing readings of Locke? What is at stake here? What, if anything, turns on which of them accurately captures Locke's view? How does Locke think his linguistic thesis tells against competing views, such as those of the scholastics? What is the difference between a proposition and a list? Can Locke account for this difference? There is clearly a difference between merely thinking that the cat is on the mat and asserting that it is. Can Locke account for this difference?

Teaching & Learning Guide for: What is at Stake in the Cartesian Debates on the Eternal Truths?

Patricia Easton — 2009-08-23T12:23:00Z

Any study of the 'Scientific Revolution' and particularly Descartes' role in the debates surrounding the conception of nature (atoms and the void v. plenum theory, the role of mathematics and experiment in natural knowledge, the status and derivation of the laws of nature, the eternality and necessity of eternal truths, etc.) should be placed in the philosophical, scientific, theological, and sociological context of its time. Seventeenth-century debates concerning the nature of the eternal truths such as '2 + 2 = 4' or the law of inertia turn on the question of whether these truths were created along with nature, or were uncreated and subsisting in God's mind. One's answer to that question has direct consequences for conceptions of the necessity/contingency of mathematical and natural knowledge, how knowledge of such truths is accomplished by humans, and what grounds these truths. In this paper, I review the positions of four successors to Descartes' philosophy on the question of the eternal truths to illustrate how in specific ways that question with its theological, metaphysical, modal, and epistemological dimensions concerned the objectivity and certainty of the discoveries of the new science. Clarke, Desmond. Descartes' Philosophy of Science. University Park, Penn State Press, 1982. This work provides an account of Descartes as a practicing scientist whose rationalism is mitigated by reliance on experiment and experience. Author re-examines Descartes' philosophical and scientific works in this new light. Dear, Peter. Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500[ndash]1700. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. This work provides a useful overview of the issues and thinkers of the Scientific Revolution. Of particular relevance is chapter 8 on Cartesian and Newtonian science. Funkenstein, Amos. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986. This work is an advanced study of the theological and metaphysical foundations of early modern science. Discussions include questions of God's nature, God's knowledge in relation to human knowledge, providence, the laws of nature, and the truths of mathematics. In particular, chapter 3 discusses Descartes' account of the eternal truths and divine omnipotence. Garber, Daniel. Descartes' Metaphysical Physics. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992. This work examines how Descartes' metaphysical doctrines of God, soul, and body set the groundwork for his physics. It includes a study of God and the grounds for the laws of physics (chapter 9). Henry, John. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. 3rd ed. New York, Palgrave, Macmillan Press, 2008. This work provides a brief, general, and informative overview of the Scientific Revolution, including the themes of method, magic, religion, and culture. Osler, Margaret J. Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994. This work is an examination and comparison of the mechanical philosophies of Gassendi and Descartes. It offers in-depth discussion of the issue of voluntarism and intellectualism in the period and how that related to conceptions of laws of nature and the eternal truths. Shapin, Steven. The Scientific Revolution. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996. This work provides a critical synthesis of as well as a guide to recent scholarship in the history of science for a general readership. Dr. Robert A. Hatch's Scientific Revolution Website: http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/rhatch/pages/03-Sci-Rev/SCI-REV-Home/ A compendium of resources for the study of Scientific Revolution. Early English Books Online: http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home Early English Books Online (EEBO) contains digital facsimile page images of virtually every work printed in England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales and British North America and works in English printed elsewhere from 1473 to 1700. Early Modern Resources: http://www.earlymodernweb.org.uk/emr/ Early Modern Resources is a gateway for all those interested in finding electronic resources relating to the early modern period in history. Gallica, the Digital Library of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ An ever-growing digital library which includes numerous primary and secondary texts of relevance to Descartes and his role in Scientific Revolution. Hatfield, Gary, 'René Descartes', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/descartes/ Slowik, Edward, 'Descartes' Physics', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/descartes-physics/ The following is five weeks covering Cartesian Science in a course on Descartes or the Scientific Revolution, or 17th-century theories of matter, or related themes on early modern truth and method, especially on the continent. This material is best suited to a graduate level audience, but it could be modified to suit an upper-division undergraduate course, as the readings are basically primary texts whose context and background can be explained in lectures. Week 1: Cartesian Revolution in France Scientific method Role of mathematics and experiment Certainty of scientific knowledge Readings: Hatfield, Gary, 'René Descartes', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/descartes/ Descartes, Discourse on Method, Parts 1[ndash]3 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, First Meditation. Week 2: Descartes' Scientific Treatises Mechanization and mathematization of nature Primary[ndash]secondary quality distinction Readings: Discourse on Method, Parts 4[ndash]6 Selections from Descartes' Scientific Essays: The World or Treatise on Light (ATXI 3[ndash]48); Treatise on Man (ATXI 119[ndash]202); Optics (ATVI 82[ndash]147). Slowik, Edward, 'Descartes' Physics', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta; URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/descartes-physics/ Henry, John, 'The Mechanical Philosophy,' chapter 5. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. 3rd ed. Macmillan, 2008. Week 3: Descartes' Theory of Nature Descartes' derivation of the law of conservation and the three laws of motion God's role in the metaphysics and physics of nature Readings: Selections from Principles of Philosophy, Preface (all); Letter to Elizabeth; Part I: 1[ndash]8; Part II: 1[ndash]45, 55, 64; Part III: 1[ndash]4, 15[ndash]19, 45[ndash]47; Part IV: 187[ndash]207. John Henry, 'Religion and Science,' chapter 6. The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. 3rd ed. Macmillan, 2008. Week 4: Post-1650 Cartesian Science: Necessity and Contingency in Nature Debates on God, Creation, and Causes Readings: Easton, Patricia, 'What is at Stake in the Cartesian Debates on the Eternal Truths?' Philosophy Compass 4.2 (2009): 348[ndash]62. Malebranche, Nicolas, 'Elucidation 10', from The Search after Truth (1674). Note: All selections available in Nicolas Malebranche (1992). Philosophical Selections, edited by S. Nadler, Hackett. Gottfried Leibniz (1714) Monadology. Week 5: Causes in Nature and Morals Theodicy as an explanation of defect and evil in a lawful universe: Malebranche v. Leibniz Readings: Nicolas Malebranche, Elucidation XVI (on occasionalism), and Treatise on Nature and Grace, Discourse One, Part 1. Gottfried Leibniz (1706), Theodicy. Weekly questions can be used to focus the readings. This can be done in a web or e-mail discussion thread, as a weekly assignment, or for in class discussion. I require students to post a short paragraph in response to the question or some posting by a classmate on the question. Students are required to post by 10 a.m. the day before we meet for class on a course website. Week 1: According to Descartes, what role does skepticism play in scientific reasoning? Week 2: Comment on the following: 'But I am supposing this machine to be made by the hands of God, and so I think you may reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting more artistry than I could possibly ascribe to it' [Treatise on Man; ATXI 120]. Week 3: What is Descartes' conception of the relation between the metaphysics and physics of nature? Week 4: Critically discuss the positions of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz on what provides the foundation for the certitude of natural knowledge? Week 5: Explain why both Malebranche and Leibniz consider moral sin to be analogous to natural defect? Hold a debate on the question of the status of the eternal truths. The proposition will be Descartes' position: 'Eternal truths must be both created and necessary if certainty in science is to be possible'. Format: At the beginning of the 5-week module, students will be assigned to one of three roles: Team A, Team B, and judge's panel. Students will be given the debate proposition, but will not be told which team will take the affirmative and which team the negative until the time of the debate. Recommend a variation on the Classic Debate Format to encourage the development of argument: sequence begins with affirmative construction (8 minutes), negative construction (8 minutes), second affirmative construction (8 minutes), second negative construction (8 minutes), first negative rebuttal (4 minutes), first affirmative rebuttal (4 minutes), final negative rebuttal (4 minutes) and final affirmative rebuttal (4 minutes). Judges Panel: will consist of 3[ndash]4 judges who will assess the performance of Teams A and B. Judgment should be based on the persuasiveness of the team position. Debate will be held at the end of the fifth week, or semester, whichever makes most sense given the course length and structure. The author gratefully acknowledges the immensely helpful comments and suggestions by the participants in her graduate seminar on the Scientific Revolution: Benjamin Chicka, Sarah Jacques-Ross, Richard Ross, Marcella Stockstill, and Zohra Wolters.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Frege on Definitions

Sanford Shieh — 2009-09-23T04:15:00Z

Three clusters of philosophically significant issues arise from Frege's discussions of definitions. First, Frege criticizes the definitions of mathematicians of his day, especially those of Weierstrass and Hilbert. Second, central to Frege's philosophical discussion and technical execution of logicism is the so-called Hume's Principle, considered in The Foundations of Arithmetic. Some varieties of neo-Fregean logicism are based on taking this principle as a contextual definition of the operator 'the number of [hellip]', and criticisms of such neo-Fregean programs sometimes appeal to Frege's objections to contextual definitions in later writings. Finally, a critical question about the definitions on which Frege's proofs of the laws of arithmetic depend is whether the logical structures of the definientia reflect our pre-Fregean understanding of arithmetical terms. It seems that unless they do, it is unclear how Frege's proofs demonstrate the analyticity of the arithmetic in use before logicism. Yet, especially in late writings, Frege characterizes the definitions as arbitrary stipulations of the senses or references of expressions unrelated to pre-definitional understanding. One or more of these topics may be studied in a survey course in the philosophy of mathematics or a course on Frege's philosophy. The latter two topics are obviously central in a seminar in the philosophy of mathematics in general or more specialized seminars on logicism, or on mathematical definitions and concept formation. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1781, 1787], A7-10/B11-14, A151/B190. In the first Critique, Kant appears to give four distinct accounts of analytic judgments. The initial famous account explains analyticity in terms of the predicate-concept belonging to the subject-concept (A6[ndash]7/B11). In this passage, we also find an account of establishing analytic judgments on the basis of conceptual containments and the principle of non-contradiction. (The other accounts are in terms of 'identity' (A7/B1l), in terms of the explicative[ndash]ampliative contrast (A7/B11), and by reference to the notion of 'cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction' (A151/B190).) Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Trans. J. L. Austin. 2nd ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1980 [1884], especially sections 1[ndash]4, 87[ndash]91. Frege here criticizes and reformulates Kant's account of analyticity. Central to Frege's account is the provability of an analytic statement on the basis of (Frege's) logic and definitions that express analyses of (mathematical, especially arithmetical) concepts. Frege, Gottlob. Review of E. G. Husserl. 'Philosophie der Arithmetik I [1894],' in Frege, Collected Papers. Ed. B. McGuinness. Trans. M. Black et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 195[ndash]209. In this review, Frege responds to Husserl's charge that Frege's definitions fail to capture our intuitive pre-analytic arithmetical concepts by claiming that the adequacy of mathematical definitions is measured, not by their expressing the same senses, but merely by their having the same references, as pre-definitional vocabulary. It follows not only that Husserl's criticism is unfounded, but also that there can be alternative, equally legitimate, definitions of mathematical terms. Frege, 'Logic in Mathematics,' in Frege, Posthumous Writings. Trans. P. Long and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979 [1914]. 203[ndash]50. These are a set of lecture notes including, among other things, an account of proper definitions as mere abbreviation of complex signs by simple ones, in contrast to definitions which purport to express the analyses of existing concepts. Frege here claims that if there is any doubt whether a definition purporting to express an analysis succeeds in capturing the senses of the pre-definitional expressions, then the definition fails as an analysis, and should be regarded as the introduction of an entirely new expression abbreviating the definiens. Picardi, Eva. 'Frege on Definition and Logical Proof,'Temi e Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della Scienza Contemporanee. i vol. Eds. C. Cellucci and G. Sambin. Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1988. 227[ndash]30. Picardi sets out forcefully the view that unless Frege's definitions capture the meanings of existing arithmetical terms, his logicism cannot have the epistemological significance he takes it to have. Dummett, Michael. 'Frege and the Paradox of Analysis,' in Dummett, Frege and other Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 17[ndash]52. Dummett agrees with Picardi's view and analyzes the philosophical pressures that led Frege to the account of definition in 'Logic in Mathematics.' Especially significant is Dummett's claim of the centrality of the transparency of sense [ndash] that if one grasps the senses of any two expressions, one must know whether they have the same sense [ndash] in Frege's account. Benacerraf, Paul. 'Frege: The Last Logicist,'Midwest Studies in Philosophy. vol. 6. Eds. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. 17[ndash]35. Frege's aims, on Benacerraf's reading, are primarily mathematical. Frege was interested in traditional philosophical issues such as the analyticity of arithmetic only to the extent that they can be exploited for the mathematical goal of proving previously unproven arithmetical statements. Hence, Frege never had any serious interest in or need for showing that his definitions of arithmetical terms reflect existing arithmetical conceptions. Weiner, Joan. 'The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist,' in Frege: Tradition and Influence. Ed. C. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 57[ndash]79. Weiner argues that on Frege's view, prior to his definitions of arithmetical terms the references of such expressions are in fact not known by those who use arithmetical vocabulary. Thus, in Foundations, Frege operated with a 'hidden agenda' (263) namely, replacing existing arithmetic with a new science based on stipulative definitions that assign new senses to key arithmetical terms. Tappenden, Jamie. 'Extending Knowledge and 'Fruitful Concepts': Fregean Themes in the Foundations of Mathematics.'Noûs 29 (1995): 427[ndash]67. Tappenden argues that Frege takes his crucial innovation over previous practices and accounts of mathematical concept formation to be the role of quantificational structure made possible by his logical discoveries. Horty, John. Frege on Definitions: A Case Study of Semantic Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. A useful interpretation of Frege's views of definition, together with suggestive extensions for resolving the issues framing Frege's views. Shieh, Sanford. 'Frege on Definitions,'Philosophy Compass 3/5 (2008): 992[ndash]1012. A more detailed account of Frege's views on definition and the philosophical issues they raise, surveying and discussing critically the main substantive and interpretive issues. On Frege http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ On the Paradox of Analysis http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ The following is a 3-week module that can be incorporated into fairly focused historically oriented graduate-level seminars on logicism or on the paradox of analysis. It is also possible to compress the material into 2 weeks in an undergraduate or graduate class Frege's thought in general. Week I: Background, Kant on Analyticity; Definition in Foundations, Review of Husserl, and 'Logic in Mathematics' Readings Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, A7[ndash]10/B11[ndash]14. Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic, sections 1[ndash]4, 87[ndash]91. Frege, Gottlob. Review of E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I. Frege, Gottlob. 'Logic in Mathematics.' Optional Proops, Ian. 'Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment,'Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXX, 3 (2005): 588[ndash]612. Week II: The Supposed Paradox of Analysis, Picardi and Dummett; Bypassing Traditional Epistemological Issues About Mathematics, Benacerraf Readings Picardi, Eva. 'Frege on Definition and Logical Proof.' Dummett, Michael. 'Frege and the Paradox of Analysis.' Benacerraf, Paul. 'Frege: The Last Logicist.' Optional Tappenden, Jamie. 'Extending Knowledge and 'Fruitful Concepts': Fregean Themes in the Foundations of Mathematics.' Week III: Weiner's Hidden Agenda Interpretation Readings Weiner, Joan. 'The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist.' Optional Weiner, Joan. Frege in Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. To what extent is Frege's account of analyticity in Foundations a rejection, and to what extent an updating, of Kant's view of analyticity? According to Picardi it 'would be incomprehensible' how Frege's proofs tells us anything about the arithmetic we already have unless his 'definitions [are] somehow responsible to the meaning of [arithmetical] sentences as these are understood' (228). Why does she hold this? Why does Dummett agree with her? Do you think Frege's logicism needs to address this worry? What are the major differences and continuities in Frege's discussions of definition in mathematics in Foundations, the review of Husserl and 'Logic in Mathematics'? Frege writes that definitions must prove their worth by being fruitful. He also says that nothing can be proven using a proper definition that cannot be proven without it. Are these claims consistent? Why or why not? Weiner held that in Foundations Frege had 'hidden agenda.' What, according to her, is this agenda? How does this fit with Frege's later views of definition? What are Frege's main complaints about Weierstrass's definitions in 'Logic in Mathematics'? Are these criticisms consistent with Frege's account of 'definition proper' in the same text? What, if anything, is the relation between Frege's critique of Hilbert's use of definitions and Frege's later views of definitions?

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Recent Work on Propositions

Peter Hanks — 2009-09-23T04:15:00Z

Some of the most interesting recent work in philosophy of language and metaphysics is focused on questions about propositions, the abstract, truth-bearing contents of sentences and beliefs. The aim of this guide is to give instructors and students a road map for some significant work on propositions since the mid-1990s. This work falls roughly into two areas: challenges to the existence of propositions and theories about the nature and structure of propositions. The former includes both a widely discussed puzzle about propositional designators as well as direct and indirect arguments against the existence of propositions. The latter is dominated by what is currently the central debate about the metaphysics of propositions, i.e. whether they are structured, composite entities or unstructured ontological simples. This issue has eclipsed older debates about whether propositions can be identified with sets of possible worlds or other kinds of sentence intensions. Soames, Scott. 'Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.'Philosophical Topics 15 (1987): 47[ndash]87. Reprinted in Propositions and Attitudes. Eds. N. Salmon and S. Soames. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 197[ndash]239. Essential groundwork for more recent work on propositions. Soames gives a careful and exacting presentation of the case against identifying propositions with sets of possible worlds or other truth-supporting circumstances. Also contains a detailed statement of the Russellian conception of propositions on which propositions are ordered sets of objects, properties and relations. King, Jeffrey. 'Designating Propositions.'The Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 341[ndash]71. Sometimes substituting a definite description for a corresponding 'that'-clause can lead to bizarre changes in truth-conditions: compare 'Bill fears that Hillary will be president' with 'Bill fears the proposition that Hillary will be president'. This puzzle about propositional designators threatens the relational analysis of propositional attitude reports, the view that 'believes' expresses a relation to the proposition designated by its 'that'-clause, and thereby poses an indirect threat to the existence of propositions. King's solution posits an ambiguity in verbs like 'fear' that embed both 'that'-clauses and definite descriptions. Jubien, Michael. 'Propositions and the Objects of Thought.'Philosophical Studies 104 (2001): 47[ndash]62. A direct attack on the existence of propositions. Jubien deploys an analogue of the problem that Paul Benacerraf raised for set-theoretical reductions of numbers against metaphysical reductions of propositions. Just as numbers can be reduced to sets in many different ways, any reduction of propositions brings with it equally good variants, thus making any such reduction arbitrary and unmotivated. The only alternative is to treat propositions as abstract metaphysical primitives. As Jubien argues, however, abstract primitive entities are incapable of doing what propositions must do, i.e. represent objects and states of affairs on their own, without the input of thinking subjects. The upshot is the propositions cannot be reduced and they cannot be primitive, and so they must not exist. Hanks, Peter. 'How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.'Synthese 154 (2007): 121[ndash]46. Scepticism about propositions has recently led some philosophers, Jubien included, to resuscitate Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, the idea that judgment is a many-place relation to objects, properties and relations. This paper explains why Russell himself abandoned that theory, and why the theory is still refuted by an objection due to Wittgenstein. Hofweber, Thomas. 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions.'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. 2 vols. Ed. D. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 155[ndash]206. An indirect attack on the existence of propositions. Hofweber argues that sentences like 'Bill believes something that Hillary asserted' do not commit us to the existence of propositions. His view is that propositional quantification is an instance of what he calls 'internal' or 'inferential role' quantification, a kind of quantification that carries no ontological implications. Schiffer, Stephen. The Things We Mean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. esp. chs 1[ndash]2. Schiffer defends his theory of pleonastic propositions, on which propositions are unstructured, have no parts, and are very finely grained. Bealer, George. 'Propositions.'Mind 107 (1998): 1[ndash]32. Bealer defends his algebraic theory of propositions, which, like Schiffer's pleonastic account, treats propositions as unstructured metaphysical simples. King, Jeffrey. The Nature of and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. The best developed current theory of the structure in structured propositions. King identifies propositions with certain kinds of facts in which objects, properties and relations are bound together by amalgams of syntactic and semantic relations. Hanks, Peter. 'Recent Work on Propositions.'Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 1[ndash]18. A survey of work on propositions since the mid-1990s that complements this teaching and learning guide. Contains responses to Jubien's and Hofweber's arguments against propositions and critical discussions of Schiffer's pleonastic propositions and King's theory of propositional structure. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ Propositions (Matthew McGrath) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-structured/ Structured Propositions (Jeffrey King) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-singular/ Singular Propositions (Greg Fitch) The following partial syllabus can be used as a unit on recent work on propositions in graduate level courses in philosophy of language or metaphysics. Week 1: A Substitution Puzzle About Propositional Designators King, Jeffrey. 'Designating Propositions'. Moltmann, Friederike. 'Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions.'Synthese 135 (2003): 77[ndash]118. Week 2: The Benacerraf Problem and Propositional Representation Benacerraf, Paul. 'What Numbers Could Not Be.'Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 47[ndash]73. Jubien, Michael. 'Propositions and the Objects of Thought.' Week 3: Propositional Quantification Hofweber, Thomas. 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions'. Hofweber, Thomas. 'A Puzzle about Ontology.'Noûs 39 (2005): 256[ndash]83. Week 4: Schiffer on Pleonastic Propositions Schiffer, Stephen. 'Language-Created Language-Independent Entities.'Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 149[ndash]67. Schiffer, Stephen. The Things We Mean, chs 1[ndash]2. Week 5: King on Structured Propositions King, Jeffrey. 'Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates.'Noûs, 29 (1995): 516[ndash]35. King, Jeffrey. The Nature and Structure of Content, chs 1[ndash]3. Why does identifying propositions with sentence intensions, e.g. sets of possible worlds, 'require the attitudes to have a particular sort of closure under logical consequence, which they clearly don't have' (Mark Richard)? How does the difference between (a) and (b) pose a threat to the existence of propositions? Bill fears that Hillary will be president. Bill fears the proposition that Hillary will be president. What is the Benacerraf problem for metaphysical reductions of propositions? Why must a proposition represent 'on its own cuff' (Michael Jubien)? Why is this a problem for the view that propositions are primitive abstract entities? What does it mean to say that propositions are structured? Give two different accounts of what propositional structure might be.